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Destructive Issue Linkages: 
The Failure of Multilateral Trade-Competition Negotiations 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the proliferation of national competition rules at the domestic level, the 
pursuit of multilateral arrangements has encountered difficulties, especially when 
international negotiations link competition policy with trade policy. While the 
European Union has been the leading advocate of incorporating competition rules into 
the World Trade Organization, its efforts failed in 2003 with the collapse of 
negotiations at the Cancun Ministerial. This case resembles a natural experiment in 
which to compare the relative importance of two prominent issue linkages—trade-
competition and competition-Singapore Issues—attempted by the EU in its failed 
efforts. Among the WTO members, developing countries appear to have played the 
most important role in the negotiation failure. They had invested few resources and 
little reputation in advancing the trade-competition linkage and expressed concern 
over the WTO as the appropriate venue in which to undertake further negotiations. 
They also opposed the trade-competition linkage because it was distant and indirectly 
linked to their trade priorities, they faced a related information asymmetry, and they 
viewed the inclusion of competition policy as a threat to their interests. Regarding the 
Singapore Issues, the developing countries opposed this linkage because it multiplied 
the resource costs associated with the trade-competition linkage and was not seen as 
complementary to their interests. While both linkages were ‘destructive’, a 
counterfactual analysis suggests that developing country opposition to the trade-
competition linkage was the deciding factor in the failure. 
  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the proliferation of national competition rules at the domestic level, 
negotiators have faced difficulties in reaching binding arrangements over competition 
policy at the multilateral level. A long history of international negotiations over the 
linkage between trade policy and competition policy has generated a number of non-
binding multilateral initiatives—primarily through the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)
1—to regulate anticompetitive business practices that affect 
multiple jurisdictions. However, these initiatives have fallen short of aspirations to 
include competition policy in negotiations at the world’s pre-eminent trade institution, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
While the European Union (EU) has been the leading advocate of 
incorporating competition rules in the WTO, these efforts failed in 2003 with the 
collapse of negotiations at the Cancun Ministerial. By 2004, the General Council of 
the WTO had decided that work toward negotiations on the linkage between trade and 
competition policy would be suspended until the conclusion of the ongoing Doha 
Round.
2
 To be sure, the linkage between competition policy and trade policy was not 
the sole reason for the collapse of the overall Cancun talks. But the failure of this 
                                                 
1
 Multilateral negotiations on competition policy have also taken place in the International Competition 
Network. These negotiations, however, do not produce binding rules and do not explicitly link 
competition policy with trade policy. 
2
 World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 
August 2004, WT/L/579, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm#invest_comp_gpa. 
  
negotiation linkage is puzzling because of the volume of previously successful 
multilateral initiatives to link the two policies. What happened at the WTO 
negotiations to doom the trade-competition linkage? To answer this question, the 
article focuses specifically on the reasons why competition policy failed to be added 
formally to the WTO negotiating agenda. Understanding this failure should help to 
illuminate the obstacles that will need to be overcome if similar pitfalls are to be 
avoided in post-Doha negotiations on competition policy and, more generally, the 
long-term pursuit of competition rules at the multilateral level. 
This particular case is complicated by the fact that two different issue linkages 
were at play in the WTO negotiations. The complication, however, usefully resembles 
a natural experiment in which a number of factors are held constant across the two 
linkages, and a counterfactual analysis can be used to test the comparative importance 
of both linkages for contributing to the negotiation failure. For analytical clarity, the 
two linkages are disaggregated as separate negotiating tactics. First, competition 
policy was linked to trade policy. The EU’s push for adding competition policy to the 
WTO agenda derives from a preference for binding mechanisms due to its unique 
domestic experience with regional integration. This position was reinforced by the 
considerable amount of resources and reputation that the EU had invested in 
achieving the linkage. Second, competition policy was linked with three other trade-
related issues, the so-called Singapore Issues, as part of an indivisible negotiating 
package. Again, the EU had invested a considerable amount of resources and 
reputation in including competition policy among the Singapore Issues. This linkage, 
however, may have doomed competition policy at Cancun as it increased the number 
of areas for potential disagreement. 
  
The analysis suggests that the primary cause of the EU’s negotiating failure 
was the opposition of developing countries. They had invested few resources and little 
reputation in advancing the trade-competition linkage and expressed concern over the 
WTO as the appropriate venue in which to undertake further negotiations. They also 
opposed the trade-competition linkage because it was distant and indirectly linked to 
their trade priorities, they faced a related information asymmetry, and they viewed the 
inclusion of competition policy as a threat to their interests. Regarding the Singapore 
Issues, the developing countries opposed this linkage because it multiplied the 
resource costs associated with the trade-competition linkage and was not seen as 
complementary to their interests. While both linkages were ‘destructive’, a 
counterfactual analysis suggests that developing country opposition to the trade-
competition linkage was the deciding factor in the failure. These empirical findings 
highlight the growing importance of developing countries in shaping the international 
competition and trading agendas. 
The article proceeds in the following manner. The next section discusses 
theoretical insights from the literature on international negotiation and issue linkages, 
elaborates the two linkages at the core of the study and posits two testable hypotheses. 
The third section identifies the origins of the EU’s preferences for the addition of 
competition policy to the WTO and contrasts them with the positions of the 
developing countries. The article then describes the historical development of the two 
linkages in different international organizations with particular emphasis on 
subsequent WTO ministerial conferences. The next section identifies the EU’s 
position at Cancun with reference to the draft WTO negotiating text. The sixth section 
considers the extent to which the developing countries contributed to the failure to 
add competition policy to the WTO agenda. This section also undertakes a 
  
counterfactual analysis to determine which linkage was the most important cause of 
negotiation failure. The article concludes with a summary of the findings and lessons 
learned for the possible future spread of competition rules at the multilateral level. 
 
II. NEGOTIATION FAILURE AND ISSUE LINKAGES 
The scholarly literature has identified a number of theoretical and 
methodological issues related to the structure, strategy, power, process, behaviour, 
effectiveness and outcome of international negotiations.
3
 The intent of this article is 
not to undertake an extensive literature review of the work in this area, but rather to 
highlight some of the more important insights relevant to the case in question, 
particularly those regarding negotiation failure and the role of issue linkage. 
In this study, failure to add competition policy formally to the WTO 
negotiating agenda serves as the dependent variable. The existence of ‘failure’ is 
defined as an outcome of non-agreement.
4
 This use of the term ‘failure’ is not 
intended to convey a normative stance toward the outcome of the negotiations. 
Rather, such an outcome can follow from suboptimal coordination among states.
5
 As 
an alternative, ‘success’ in this case would have witnessed coordination among states 
that led to approval of the Draft Cancun Ministerial Declaration, specifically 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., JOHN ODELL, NEGOTIATING THE WORLD ECONOMY (2000); HOWARD RAIFFA, 
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); William I. Zartman, What I Want to Know 
about Negotiations, 7 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 5 (2002). 
4
 Arild Underdal, Causes of Negotiation ‘Failure’, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
RESEARCH  183 (1983). 
5
 Andrew Moravcsik, A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation, 
53 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 267 (1999), at 274. 
  
Paragraph 14 on competition policy.
6
 Given the absence of this alternative outcome, 
two interrelated and crucial concepts require clarification: negotiation failure and 
issue linkage. 
For the purposes of this article, issue linkage is understood as a negotiating 
tactic (independent variable) that may increase or decrease the likelihood of failure 
(dependent variable). Sebenius provides a useful definition of issue linkage as a 
situation in which issues are ‘simultaneously discussed for joint settlement’.7 As a 
factor decreasing the likelihood of failure, issue linkage encourages behaviour that has 
been labelled variously as trade-offs, log-rolling, and side-payments. As a factor 
increasing the likelihood of failure, issue linkage increases the number of areas where 
disagreement can occur. Keohane notes that such ‘destructive linkages’ may follow 
from issue pairings ‘that are inconsistent with regime principles’.8 Such destructive 
linkages may also be viewed as ‘forced linkages’ which ‘contain the potential for 
eliciting strong negative reactions, which may overwhelm the original issues at 
stake’.9 Given this potential for linkages to be destructive, the failure to add 
competition policy to the WTO agenda may be explained by problems related to the 
tactic of issue linkage. 
For analytical clarity, it is necessary to disaggregate two instances of tactical 
issue linkage that were at play in the WTO negotiations. First, an attempt was made to 
link competition policy with trade policy. This linkage may have generated opposition 
                                                 
6
 World Trade Organization, Draft Cancún Ministerial Text (2003), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/draft_decl_e.htm. 
7
 James Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties, 37 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 281 (1983), at 287. 
8
 ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, 92 (1984). 
9
 Sebenius, supra note 4, at 286. 
  
because it directly threatened the interests of certain negotiators. At the same time, the 
linkage and its trade-related benefits may not have been sufficiently clear to certain 
negotiators. Such a lack of clarity can be particularly high when negotiating new, 
behind-the-border regulatory issues because of the high information asymmetries 
associated with linking such issues. 
Second, four trade-related issues were linked into one package, the so-called 
Singapore Issues of government procurement, trade facilitation, investment, and 
competition policy. This call to negotiate the four Singapore Issues as one indivisible 
package may have increased the likelihood that competition policy failed to be added 
formally to the WTO negotiating agenda. For example, opposition directed 
exclusively at any one of the three non-competition Singapore Issues may have 
derailed efforts to add competition policy to the negotiating agenda because none of 
the four issues could be removed from the indivisible package and negotiated 
separately. 
The presence of these two issue linkages offers a natural experiment in which 
a number of factors are held constant.
10
 The negotiations occurred over the same 
period of time within the same negotiating framework and comprised the same sets of 
actors. This allows the analyst to undertake a focused examination of the key causal 
factors by controlling for a wide variety of variables that could otherwise have 
affected the political decisions taken in such a comprehensive negotiation as a WTO 
trade round. 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., Gary Cox, Frances Rosenbluth & Michael Thies, Electoral Rules, Career Ambitions, and 
Party Structure: Conservative Factions in Japan’s Upper and Lower Houses, 44 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 115 (2000); Thad Dunning, Improving Causal Inference: 
Strengths and Limitations of Natural Experiments 61 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 282 
(2008). 
  
Based on the preceding discussion, Figure 1 summarises two different 
relationships that can be hypothesized between the independent variables (issue 
linkages) and the failure to add competition policy to the WTO negotiating agenda. 
The two linkages are selected as independent variables because they represent the two 
most prominent negotiating tactics employed by the EU in this case. Selecting the two 
linkages also allows the analyst to evaluate the impact of conflating four issues as a 
single negotiating package. This approach should help to determine whether 
competition policy failed to be added to the negotiating agenda as a result of 
objections specific to the trade-competition linkage or objections related to a non-
competition Singapore Issue. 
 
Figure 1: Hypotheses 
H1: Opposition to the trade-competition linkage led to the failure of competition 
policy to be added formally to the WTO negotiating agenda. 
H2: Opposition to at least one of the issues in the indivisible Singapore package led to 
the failure of competition policy to be added formally to the WTO negotiating agenda. 
 
By investigating opposition to each of these linkages, the study seeks to 
identify which linkage was most important for explaining the failure to add 
competition policy to the WTO negotiating agenda. A counterfactual analysis will be 
used to test the comparative importance of both linkages contributing to the 
negotiation failure.
11
 In particular, the counterfactual analysis investigates the 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., James D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, 43 WORLD 
POLITICS 169 (1991); Gary King & Langche Zeng, When Can History be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of 
Counterfactual Inference, 51 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 183 (2007); PHILIP 
  
plausible and logical outcome of the negotiations if competition policy had not been 
linked to the Singapore Issues. Without evidence that competition policy would have 
been added to the WTO negotiating agenda as a single issue, the competition-
Singapore Issues linkage cannot be identified as the primary cause of the negotiating 
failure. The relevant evidence for the comparison is drawn from the positions of the 
developing countries prior to the failure in Cancun. 
The task of the following study is to examine the sources, extent, and nature of 
opposition that was generated by these two linkages. To do so, the article introduces 
original research based on the qualitative analysis of secondary sources and primary 
sources including public reports, official government documents, WTO declarations 
and decisions, and speeches by EU and other officials. 
 
III. COMPETING POLICY PREFERENCES IN THE WTO CONTEXT 
As Conceição-Heldt argues, ‘in order to understand issue linkage, one has to 
try to define the underlying preferences of the involved actors’.12 Because the EU has 
been the most vocal advocate of incorporating competition policy into the WTO, it is 
worth investigating the Union’s preferences on the multilateralization of this policy.13 
                                                                                                                                            
TETLOCK & AARON BELKIN, COUNTERFACTUAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN WORLD 
POLITICS (eds, 1996). 
12
 Eugénia Conceição-Heldt, Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy 13 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 285 (2008), at 286. 
13
 Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access 91 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1997); David J. Gerber, The U.S.-European Conflict Over the 
Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience Perspective 34 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 
123 (2000); Angela Wigger, COMPETING FOR COMPETITIVENESS: THE POLITICS OF THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE EU COMPETITION REGIME, 272-282 (2008). 
  
The EU position can then be contrasted with the preferences of other members of the 
WTO. While it is not possible in the context of this article to explore the preferences 
of all WTO members, it is useful to explore the factors that motivated the general 
developing country opposition to adding competition policy to the negotiating agenda. 
The US and other advanced industrialized economies were also actively engaged in 
the negotiations. However, given their different preferences, they focused their 
energies on other issues and did not pursue active and strong opposition to either 
linkage, becoming merely unreliable partners for the EU. 
The EU position on international competition policy can be described as a 
preference to pursue binding multilateral measures through the WTO. These measures 
would include subjecting individual competition decisions to the WTO’s binding 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM).
14
 This preference can be understood as the 
result of the EU’s internal and external approach to competition policy. Internally, the 
EU has exerted considerable effort and expended significant resources over the years 
pursuing the gradual and binding convergence of national regulation within its 
regional market. In addition to the binding harmonization of competition law in the 
                                                 
14
 For official EU positions on the need for binding multilateral competition rules, see Leon Brittan, 
Competition Policy and the Trading System: Towards International Rules in the WTO, speech at the 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, November 20 (1997); Leon Brittan, A 
Framework for International Competition, speech at the World Competition Forum, Davos, 
Switzerland, February 3 (1992); K. Mehta, The Role of Competition in a Globalized Trade 
Environment, speech at 3rd WTO Symposium on Competition Policy and the Multilateral Trading 
System, Geneva, April 17 (1999); Alexander Schaub, International Co-operation in Antitrust Matters: 
Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/MDD Proceedings 1 COMPETITION POLICY 
NEWSLETTER 2 (1998); Karel Van Miert, Globalization of Competition: The Need for Global 
Governance, speech at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium, March 25 (1998). 
  
Single European Market, the EU experience has included binding dispute resolution 
via the European Court of Justice.
15
 Given this domestic experience, it would appear 
quite natural for the EU to prefer a binding multilateral approach via an international 
organization—the WTO and its DSM—as the best means for addressing the 
international challenges facing competition policy.
16
 
Externally, the EU’s preference was uniquely shaped by the resources and 
reputation it had invested in the multilateralization of competition policy. The EU’s 
active signalling since the early 1990s of an advocacy position increased the 
credibility of its commitment among trade negotiators prior to Cancun. A need to 
protect and enhance this reputation added further impetus to the EU’s promotion of 
competition policy at the WTO because, as Keohane argues, a reputation ‘becomes an 
important asset in persuading others to enter into agreements with it’.17 Reputation 
becomes an important asset especially in situations of repeated negotiations. Given 
the iterative nature of WTO negotiations, the EU wished to protect and enhance the 
advocacy reputation it had established on this issue by successfully adding it to the 
WTO negotiating agenda. The costs of backing down from the linkage are high 
because such a change of position could have damaged the EU’s ‘ability to reach 
mutually beneficial cross-issue deals’ in the future.18 
It is difficult to speak of one common position or coalition of developing 
                                                 
15
 On the historical development and supranationalization of EU competition policy, see Gerber, supra 
note 13;  David J. Gerber, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: 
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998). 
16
 Fox, supra note 13. 
17
 Keohane, supra note 8, at 94. 
18
 Lisa Martin, International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process 5 ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS 125 (1993), at 129. 
  
countries in general or specifically in relation to the multilateralization of competition 
policy. Nonetheless, some common factors can be identified that may help to explain 
the position of many developing countries. First, by the end of the 1990s, many 
developing countries were beginning to establish coalitions and promote actively their 
interests in international trade negotiations.
19
 Due to a growing diffusion of power in 
the WTO, developing countries were ‘focusing increasingly on specific issues of 
interest to them and working through negotiation processes to effect gains in their 
favor’.20 Second, the developing countries believed that they had not benefited from 
previous trade rounds and that their priorities had not been given sufficient attention 
in WTO negotiations.
21
 Third, specific to competition policy, many developing 
countries did not have competition laws until the 1990s.
22
 This meant that many 
developing countries lacked significant policy expertise in the area and the 
technicalities of how it linked to trade policy. These three factors combined to create a 
general developing country position of wariness at expanding the negotiating agenda 
                                                 
19
 Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade 
Organization 8 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 79 (2003); AMRITA NARLIKAR, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN 
THE GATT & WTO (2003); J. P. Singh, Coalitions, Developing Countries, and International Trade: 
Research Findings and Prospects 11 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 499 (2006). 
20
 J. P. Singh, Weak Powers and Globalism: The Impact of Plurality on Weak-Strong Negotiations in 
the International Economy 5 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 449 (2000), at 478. 
21
 Kevin Gallagher, Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round 15 REVIEW 
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 62 (2008), at 73; Jacob Kol & L. Alan Winters, The 
EU After Cancun: Can the Leopard Change its Spots? 9 EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW 
1 (2004), at 24. 
22
 Chad Damro, The New Trade Politics and EU Competition Policy: Shopping for Convergence and 
Cooperation 13 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 867 (2006), at 875. 
  
and determination to make sure that any possible agreement resulted in clear trade 
benefits to them. Likewise, the developing countries had domestic experiences with 
competition policy that differed considerably from the EU and did not have an 
international advocacy reputation to protect or enhance in this area. 
 
IV. MULTIPLE VENUES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE TWO 
LINKAGES 
Despite the failure in the Doha Round, competition policy continues to be 
treated as a trade-related issue in other international negotiations taking place outside 
the WTO. Since 2001, the International Competition Network in particular has pushed 
forward the multilateral competition agenda, but it does not explicitly link 
competition policy with trade policy. Rather, the multilateralization of competition 
policy and its links to trade have long been discussed in other international 
organizations. This section details two different venues—UNCTAD and OECD—that 
have explicitly linked the policies and provides a historical background of the 
emergence of the two linkages leading to the WTO’s Cancun Ministerial. 
In the early twentieth century, states initiated efforts to increase cooperation in 
what is now known as competition policy. In particular, these early efforts focused on 
cooperation over the international prohibition of anticompetitive (or restrictive) 
business practices. As Fox describes 
Trading nations have discussed the possibility of world disciplines 
against restrictive business practices since the mid- to late-1940s, when 
they contemplated and nearly adopted the Havana Charter [to establish 
the International Trade Organization]. Thereafter, nations formulated 
voluntary codes and principles in the context of the United Nations 
  
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
23
 
The common thread in all of these previous initiatives to link trade and competition 
policy has been their non-binding voluntary nature. 
The OECD provided an important intergovernmental venue for increasing 
voluntary international cooperation among developed countries in competition 
matters. This cooperation began largely under a series of non-binding OECD 
Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade. 
These non-binding recommendations were initiated by OECD members who noted 
that they had increasingly similar competition laws and would face increasingly 
similar problems as the global economy liberalized.
24
 Because non-members, such as 
those with developing and centralized economies, typically did not have competition 
laws, the OECD Recommendations naturally focused on issues of importance to its 
developed members. 
For the developing countries, non-binding international initiatives linking 
trade and competition were undertaken in a different venue, the UNCTAD. This 
organization formulated a host of initiatives to address restrictive business practices 
                                                 
23
 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, in 
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (D. C. Esty & D. Geradin eds., 2001), at 350. For other discussions of the historical 
development of international competition policy, see Fox, supra note 13; Gerber, supra note 13; Allard 
D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Anti-Trust Field and in Particular the Agreement between 
the United States of American and the Commission of the European Communities 30 COMMON 
MARKET LAW REVIEW 571 (1993). 
24
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Nature, History and Potential 
Benefits of Positive Comity DAFFE/CLP/WP3(98)3 (1998), at 7. 
  
and competition policy, including voluntary codes, handbooks, and even a Model Law 
on Competition to assist countries drafting competition laws for the first time. Most 
prominent among its competition-related initiatives are the Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices, released in 1980 and reviewed regularly.
25
 
Through the OECD and UNCTAD, developed and developing countries 
undertook formal initiatives that established the trade-competition linkage as an 
agenda item for further international deliberation. These deliberations took on a new 
momentum in the 1990s, with the EU’s calls for an initiative on trade and competition 
policy at the WTO’s First Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996.26 The Ministerial 
Declaration called for the establishment of a Working Group on the Interaction 
Between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) ‘to study issues raised by Members 
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-
competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further 
consideration in the WTO framework’ (Paragraph 20).27 The WGTCP was to ‘draw 
upon and be without prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate 
intergovernmental fora’ (Paragraph 20). Thus, competition policy was linked as one 
of the four so-called Singapore Issues (along with investment, government 
procurement, and trade facilitation) that were to be negotiated as a package deal at 
                                                 
25
 Damro, supra note 22, at 875. 
26
 Jagdish Bhagwati, Don’t Cry for Cancún 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 52 (2004), at 60; Wigger, supra 
note 13, at 283. 
27
 World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration (1996), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. 
  
future WTO meetings. As Deese argues, ‘From its earliest roots, the Singapore Issues 
were fundamentally the EU’s agenda’.28 
During subsequent WTO meetings and following the Third Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle, the WGTCP’s mandate was renewed.29 As the United States 
rejected EU calls for competition issues to be covered by the WTO’s binding dispute 
settlement mechanism, the WGTCP focused primarily on the identification of core 
competition principles. As for developing countries, the Singapore Issues had 
‘acquired a symbolic importance by the Seattle Ministerial in 1999 as the blocking 
point for least developed and developing members that objected to major delays in the 
implementation of certain Uruguay Round agreements’.30 
In the Declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, the WTO 
members recognized ‘the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the 
contribution of competition policy to international trade and development, and the 
need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area’ (Paragraph 
23) and agreed ‘that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference [Cancun] on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit 
consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations’ (Paragraph 23).31 The 
Declaration also explicitly recognized the needs of developing countries and agreed to 
‘work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, including 
                                                 
28
 DAVID A. DEESE, WORLD TRADE POLITICS: POWER, PRINCIPLES, AND LEADERSHIP 
(2008), at 146. 
29
 See, World Trade Organization, Seattle Ministerial Conference (1999), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/min99_e.htm. 
30
 Deese, supra note 28, at 147. 
31
 World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. 
  
UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide 
strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs’ 
(Paragraph 24). They instructed the WGTCP to work until the forthcoming Fifth 
Ministerial Conference on the clarification of core principles, including transparency, 
non-discrimination, and procedural fairness; provisions on hardcore cartels; 
modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of 
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building (Paragraph 
25). Among the Singapore Issues, competition policy had survived due to the 
inclusion of technical assistance and capacity building provisions for developing 
countries.
32
 
Since the WTO’s First Ministerial Conference, the EU had pushed for the 
inclusion of competition policy on the WTO agenda, even going so far as to suggest 
that it be discussed within the context of the WTO’s binding DSM. At the same time, 
developing country concerns had continued to grow over the benefit of negotiating the 
Singapore Issues within the Doha Round. Despite these concerns, compromises were 
reached and competition policy and the Singapore Issues were up for negotiation at 
Cancun ‘at EU insistence’.33 
 
V. CLARIFYING THE EU POSITION AT CANCUN 
In the run-up to the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference to be held in Cancun 
in September 2003, the EU continued to play an active role in WGTCP deliberations 
and insist that competition policy officially be added to the WTO negotiating agenda. 
The EU continued to support publicly and invest a great deal of energy and reputation 
                                                 
32
 Wigger, supra note 13, at 290. 
33
 Kol & Winters, supra note 21, at 17. 
  
in both the linkage between trade and competition policy and the linkage between 
competition policy and the other Singapore Issues. 
On 21 July 2003, the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council 
officially adopted the Union’s position for the upcoming Cancun Ministerial. In the 
document, the Council addressed all four Singapore Issues as a single package 
arguing that 
Cancun also needed to establish the modalities for the Singapore issues, 
thus ensuring the prompt formal launch of the negotiations agreed at 
Doha. The Council stressed that the launch of negotiations on all four of 
the Singapore issues at Cancun was necessary in order to preserve the 
principle of the single undertaking. In this regard the Council confirmed 
the objective of negotiating new WTO rules and disciplines in all four 
areas, and rejected suggestions that any one of the four Singapore issues 
might be removed from the scope of the single undertaking.
34
 
 
The EU position is reflected in the Draft Cancun Ministerial Declaration, 
which was submitted by WTO General Council chairperson Carlos Pérez del Castillo 
and Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi on 31 August 2003, as a basis for 
discussions. The Draft Declaration noted, in Paragraph 14, two optional forms of 
language on competition policy that were up for consideration (see Figure 2), the 
former of which was supported by the EU.
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Figure 2: Draft Cancun Ministerial Declaration on Competition Policy 
14.   [Taking note of the work done by the Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy under the mandate in paragraphs 23-25 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, we decide to commence negotiations on the basis of the 
modalities set out in Annex E to this document.] 
 
[We take note of the discussions that have taken place in the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy since the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference. The situation does not provide a basis for the commencement of 
negotiations in this area. Accordingly, we decide that further clarification of the issues 
be undertaken in the Working Group.] 
 
The EU clearly preferred the commencement of negotiations on the basis of the 
modalities set out in Annex E. An EU Background Note of 4 September stated that 
‘only the text clearly indicating the launch of negotiations is satisfactory for the 
EU’.36 
Annex E on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy called for 
negotiations on ‘voluntary cooperation on anti-competitive practices which adversely 
affect international trade, in particular hardcore cartels… and assisting WTO 
Members in the establishment, implementation and enforcement of competition rules 
within their respective jurisdictions’ (Paragraph 1).37 It also stated that ‘The 
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negotiations will not deal with state-to-state arrangements that limit competition or 
with practices implemented pursuant to such arrangements’ (Paragraph 1). The Annex 
clarifies that the individual decisions of national competition authorities would not be 
subject to challenge under the DSM. Rather, consideration would be given to a 
possible peer review mechanism. The principle of non-discrimination would apply 
only to ‘laws, regulations and guidelines of general application’ and the principle of 
procedural fairness would ‘respect the legal and judicial systems of each WTO 
Member’ (Paragraph 2). Given the emphasis on voluntary cooperation and removal of 
the DSM from consideration, Annex E represents a scaling back from the EU’s initial 
preference for binding WTO mechanisms to address competition issues. 
With a nod toward the developing countries, Annex E reaffirms that ‘full 
account shall be taken of the industrial policy, social policy and other needs of 
developing and least-developed country participants and appropriate flexibility 
provided to address them’ (Paragraph 3). All Members would be assured their right to 
‘implement exceptions or exclusions from the application of national competition 
laws on the basis of transparent domestic legal processes’ and developing and least-
developed countries would be afforded transition periods (Paragraph 3). The Annex 
further notes that technical assistance and capacity building in developing and least-
developed countries would be pursued through collaborative efforts with ‘other 
international organizations, including UNCTAD, the World Bank, the OECD and 
others’ (Paragraph 4). Finally, the Annex called for the establishment of a Negotiating 
Group on Trade and Competition Policy (Paragraph 5). 
 
VI. THE FAILURE OF COMPETITION POLICY AT CANCUN 
  
The negotiations in Cancun from 10-14 September 2003 served notice that 
competition policy would no longer be part of the Doha negotiations. Officially, this 
decision did not occur until 1 August 2004 with the General Council’s Decision on 
the post-Cancun work programme, the so-called July Package. In this decision, the 
WTO’s General Council agreed that competition policy, investment, and government 
procurement ‘will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that [Doha] 
Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will 
take place within the WTO during the Doha Round’ (1g).38 Trade facilitation, 
however, survived the cut, and the commencement of negotiations on this one 
Singapore Issue was agreed on the basis of modalities set out in a separate annex. 
In such a comprehensive negotiation, it is difficult to disentangle the various 
causes of overall failure and/or determine which are most important. What seems 
clear is that the two linkages at the centre of this study were not the only deal-breakers 
for the overall negotiations.
39
 Nevertheless, they were important items that remained 
on the bargaining table and in play at Cancun. Indeed, at the actual negotiations, the 
EU’s Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy conceded that the Singapore Issues would 
not have to be negotiated as a package and ‘indicated that he would have been willing 
to let go of investment and competition policy’.40 This concession, however, does not 
explain the reason why competition policy failed to be added to the negotiating 
agenda. The question remains: Was the fate of competition policy sealed as a result of 
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objections specific to the trade-competition linkage or objections related to the 
competition-Singapore Issues linkage? 
It seems the fate of competition policy was sealed in the summer before the 
Cancun Ministerial was convened. To understand the demise of competition policy, it 
is instructive to investigate in more detail the positions of its opponents in the 
immediate run-up to Cancun. In particular, the final meeting of the WGTCP in May 
2003 provided an early indication that trade-competition linkage would be 
problematic due the concerns of developing countries. 
As noted above, the EU sought to add competition issues to the Doha Round 
as provided for in Annex E of the Draft Cancun Ministerial Declaration. This Annex 
identified the primary competition issue for inclusion as voluntary cooperation, 
especially on hardcore cartels. Marsden argues that such a commitment represented 
only an ‘indirect and distant link to trade’.41 The indirectness and distance of the link 
suggests that the purported trade-related benefits of adding competition policy to the 
negotiating agenda were not sufficiently clear to developing countries. Despite the 
EU’s submission of various documents to and participation in regular meetings of the 
WGTCP, the developing countries still faced an information asymmetry related to this 
issue linkage. 
The developing countries clearly expressed their doubts over the wisdom and 
benefit of linking these two policies at the WGTCP meeting of 26-27 May 2003. 
Their various concerns were articulated most comprehensively in the intervention of 
the Nigerian Representative to the meeting. These concerns can be broadly 
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categorized as revolving around the adoption of competition law and establishment of 
enforcement agencies, the relationship between proposals and existing WTO 
principles and provisions, and the need for clarification (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Developing Country Concerns 
Adoption of competition law and establishment of relevant enforcement agencies 
 Competition policy overshadowed by higher priorities 
 Extent to which current proposals would allow for preservation of policy space in 
regard to developmental objectives as opposed to promoting market access and 
market presence or harmonization objectives 
 Difficulties arising from disparities between countries and/or their firms in respect 
of levels of development and competitiveness, experience in the adoption or 
implementation of competition laws, and the capacity to implement such 
legislation 
 Lack of clarity of and operational difficulties pertaining to the current proposals 
relating to core principles, hardcore cartels, and related matters 
 
Relationship between proposals and… 
 Existing WTO principles of transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural 
fairness 
 Existing WTO provisions regarding confidentiality, consultations, and safeguards 
 
Need for clarification on… 
 Nature and treatment of de jure vs. de facto discrimination 
 Role of exceptions 
 Implications of principle of non-discrimination for treatment of local firms and 
industrial policies of developing countries 
 Responsibility of exporting countries to take action in respect of export or 
  
international cartels 
 Scope of confidentiality provisions 
 Modalities and experiences relating to voluntary cooperation 
 Relationship between cooperation in multilateral framework and efforts to 
facilitate cooperation at bilateral and regional levels 
 Balance and sequencing of commitments regarding adoption of competition 
legislation and international cooperation in relation to exports, imports, and role of 
bilateral competition or trade pressures 
 Compliance mechanisms in multilateral framework, including dispute settlement 
and peer reviews 
 Implications for national sovereignty and balance of rights and obligations of 
WTO Members 
 Scope and content of any provisions regarding special and differential treatment, 
flexibility and progressivity 
 Appropriateness of WTO as forum for cooperation in this area 
 
Given this long list of concerns, it is easy to understand the preference of 
developing countries to avoid adding competition policy to the WTO negotiating 
agenda. As Figure 3 shows, the developing country concerns reflect an information 
asymmetry (vis-à-vis the EU) over the trade-competition linkage. Although the 
language of Annex E did not introduce a binding mechanism on any of the issues 
related to the linkage, it nevertheless represented a commitment to negotiate further 
on a variety of competition-related matters with which many developing countries had 
little domestic experience. As the last point in Figure 3 indicates, the developing 
countries also signalled their preference for venue-shopping—presumably with an eye 
  
toward UNCTAD—by noting their concerns over the WTO as the most appropriate 
forum in which to undertake such further negotiations.
43
 
In addition, Figure 3 suggests that many developing countries viewed the 
trade-competition linkage as a threat to their interests. This can be seen in the point 
made by the Nigerian Representative regarding ‘policy space’ and related discussions 
over the resource implications of adding competition policy to the negotiating agenda. 
Gallagher defines ‘policy space’ as ‘the flexibility under trade rules that provides 
nation states with adequate room to maneuver to deploy effective policies to spur 
economic development’.44 It often refers to targeted industrial policy or ‘space that 
allows developing countries a relatively larger role in economic development policy 
than is permitted by developed countries but that developed countries deployed during 
earlier stages of development’.45 In this case, developing country concerns about 
policy space arise from a belief that incorporating competition policy into the WTO 
would constrain their sovereign ability to pursue development objectives with other 
selected policies that the developed members of the WTO would view as anti-
competitive. 
While the developing countries had not invested their reputations in the goal 
of adding competition policy to the WTO negotiating agenda, they did see negative 
resource implications for agreeing such an addition in the future. Despite the 
commitment to technical assistance and capacity building in Annex E (Paragraph 4), 
developing countries generally resisted committing to new negotiations on an issue 
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area where they had little technical expertise. The incorporation of competition policy 
would stretch limited public resources that could be used elsewhere.
46
 As Kol and 
Winters argue, competition policy ‘offered little to the developing countries and 
threatened to take skilled labour and political attention away from activities that are 
more important for economic development’.47 
Given that competition policy was distant and indirectly linked to trade and 
that the developing countries faced an information asymmetry and viewed 
competition policy as a threat to their interests, it is likely that developing country 
opposition to the trade-competition linkage led to the failure of competition policy to 
be added formally to the WTO negotiating agenda (H1). 
But to what extent did the linkage to the Singapore Issues lead to the demise 
of competition policy? To be sure, the developing countries opposed negotiating the 
Singapore Issues as a single package. The threat to resources provides the clearest 
evidence of the problem related to the competition-Singapore Issues linkage. If a 
resource gap was problematic for the single trade-competition linkage, then the gap 
would be tripled or quadrupled under the competition-Singapore Issues linkage. In 
addition, the Singapore Issues were not seen by developing countries as 
complementary to their interests. As Kol and Winters argue, ‘The topics to be 
negotiated under each [Singapore] issue were not generally the key ones for 
developing counties and the clauses proposed by the EU not geared to development 
objectives’.48 Thus, because the developing countries viewed the Singapore Issues as 
a drain on their resources and not corresponding with their interests, their opposition 
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to the competition-Singapore Issues linkage likely lead to the failure to add 
competition policy to the WTO negotiating agenda (H2). 
When viewed from the perspective of the developing countries, both linkages 
were destructive and seen as potentially ‘inconsistent with the [trade] regime 
principles’.49 But how can we determine which linkage was most important for 
explaining the failure to add competition policy to the WTO negotiating agenda? At 
first look, it appears that competition policy failed because it was linked to the 
Singapore Issues as part of a package deal. From this perspective, opposition to one or 
more of the different Singapore Issues (especially investment and/or government 
procurement) caused the failure for competition policy. But if competition policy had 
been negotiated separately, would it have successfully been added to the negotiating 
agenda? The answer to this counterfactual is negative, and this can be seen in the 
opposition expressed by developing countries specifically to competition policy in the 
run-up to Cancun. In addition to the concerns detailed above, Khor notes that at the 
final WGTCP meeting in May 2003, ‘representatives of an even larger number of 
developing countries than normal spoke up and said that there was no convergence of 
views on several issues and that therefore more time was required to further discuss 
and clarify these issues, and negotiations could not proceed’ (2003: 2).50 
With the benefit of hindsight (per the July Package), it appears that only trade 
facilitation from among all four of the Singapore Issues would have had a chance to 
be added to the WTO negotiating agenda as a stand-alone issue.
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competition policy would have failed to be added to the agenda even if it had been 
negotiated as a stand-alone issue confirms that the fundamental problems with the 
trade-competition linkage were the primary cause of the failure. Therefore, in the final 
analysis, the linkage to the Singapore Issues may have been a contributing factor that 
increased the likelihood of failure but not the deciding factor for the failure. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite success at linking competition policy and trade in other multilateral 
organizations, the EU failed at Cancun to add this trade-related issue formally to the 
WTO’s negotiating agenda. This article has identified two important linkages as 
sources of the failure. These two destructive linkages represent the most prominent 
negotiating tactics employed by the EU in this case. The case itself resembles a 
natural experiment that allows for an original comparative analysis of the 
destructiveness of a single issue linkage (trade-competition) with that of linking four 
issues as a single negotiating package (competition-Singapore Issues). By 
investigating opposition to both of these linkages, the study has sought to identify 
which one was most important for explaining the negotiation failure. 
The EU’s position on the multilateralization of competition policy and its 
linkage to trade in the WTO derives largely from its domestic integration experience 
with binding mechanisms and the resources and advocacy reputation that it has 
invested in the international process. The position of the other WTO members was 
informed by different domestic experiences and the fact that they had invested fewer 
resources and less reputation in the objective of adding competition policy to the 
negotiating agenda. Despite these differences, the EU and others were able to agree at 
the Singapore Ministerial Conference a compromise simply to discuss the trade-
  
competition linkage in the WTO’s Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy. 
This agreement also linked competition policy to the other Singapore Issues as an 
indivisible package. 
Overall the conclusions on the negotiations underline the growing importance 
of developing countries in shaping the international competition and trading agendas. 
The findings suggest that opposition from the developing countries specifically to the 
trade-competition linkage was the primary cause of the failure to add competition 
policy to the WTO negotiating agenda. Developing countries opposed this linkage 
because 1) it was distant and indirectly linked to trade, 2) they faced an information 
asymmetry on this linkage, 3) and they viewed competition policy as a threat to their 
interests (e.g. sovereign policy space and resource needs). While many of the 
developing country concerns where addressed in Annex E of the Draft Cancun 
Ministerial Declaration, matters were complicated by confusion surrounding the issue 
linkage and a feeling among developing countries that they had not benefited from 
previous trade rounds. In addition, the developing countries had invested few 
resources and little reputation in advancing the linkage and were concerned over the 
appropriateness of the WTO as the best venue in which to undertake further 
negotiations. 
Developing countries also opposed the competition-Singapore Issues linkage 
because it multiplied the resource costs associated with the trade-competition linkage 
and was not seen as complementary to their interests. But was this linkage an equally 
important cause for the failure? The finding of a counterfactual analysis shows that 
competition policy would have failed to be added to the agenda even if it had been 
negotiated as a stand-alone issue, which confirms that the developing countries’ 
  
fundamental problems with the trade-competition linkage were the primary cause of 
the failure.  
The preceding analysis has explored the conditions under which issue linkages 
may become destructive in international negotiations and the politics that arise from 
the linkage between trade and competition policy. Destructive linkages can diminish 
the likelihood of adding competition policy to multilateral negotiations when its 
inclusion can be undermined by venue-shopping opportunities, does not have 
significant levels of resources and reputation invested in it by negotiators, or is seen to 
conflict with the interests of some members (especially and increasingly developing 
countries). To overcome such negotiation pitfalls in a trade organization like the 
WTO, the trade-related benefits of linking competition policy and trade must be made 
explicit. Without explicit benefits and regardless of any actual merits of adding 
competition policy to the WTO, the linkage is only likely to meet with success in 
other established venues, such as the UNCTAD and OECD. This conclusion suggests 
that the degree of linkage clarity matters for success. Negotiations are in danger of 
failure when a professed link is unclear because states with little to gain are more 
likely to resist linkage. In this regard, the EU’s failure at the WTO provides an 
instructive example of the very real challenges facing the spread of multilateral 
competition rules despite the proliferation of national competition laws. 
